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Abstract
Attorneys elected to the US Congress and to state legislatures are systemati-
cally less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation but 
more likely to support bills that extend tort law than are legislators with differ-
ent professional backgrounds. This finding is based on the analysis of 64 roll 
call votes at the federal and state levels between 1995 and 2014. It holds when 
controlling for legislators’ ideology and is particularly strong for term-limited 
lawyer- legislators. The empirical regularity is consistent with the hypothesis that 
lawyer- legislators, at least in part, pursue their private interests when voting on 
tort issues. Our results highlight the relevance of legislators’ identities and indi-
vidual professional interests for economic policy making.
1. Introduction
There are many lawyers in US legislatures. This raises a serious agency issue in a 
representative democracy when they draft and reform law that affects their pro-
fession. The issue is more general though and refers to the question of whether 
and how professional backgrounds of legislators are to play a role in state policy 
making. This is an important aspect of how political selection might matter for 
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economic policy.1 Insights are important to inform the choice of institutions that 
govern the representation of interests in politics such as ethics laws, recusal and 
disclosure rules, and incompatibility regimes.
We concentrate on lawyers2 holding a seat in the legislature, so-called lawyer- 
legislators, for several reasons. They form one of the most prominent groups, as 
they often hold many seats (around one-third of members in the House of Rep-
resentatives have professional backgrounds as attorneys). They are, with few ex-
ceptions, members of the same professional associations (the American Bar As-
sociation and, in the case of trial lawyers, the American Association for Justice). 
Moreover, they are experts on law, their political mandate is complementary to 
their business activity, and—importantly—they are involved in drafting rules 
that, depending on their design and implementation, generate more or less de-
mand for legal services.
An important area is tort law, where lawyer-legislators face a conflict of inter-
est. In particular in the United States, where estimates of the total transactions 
generated by the tort law system amounted to $265 billion in 2010, which is equal 
to 1.82 percent of gross domestic product (Towers Watson 2012), attorney fees 
account for a large part of that, with estimates of 30 percent or higher.3 Plain-
tiffs’ lawyers and defense lawyers have a vital interest in preserving this system. 
In the literature on US tort reform, it has been argued that lawyer-legislators try 
to block reforms that are meant to simplify and limit the scope of liability rules 
or restrict damages (see, for example, Epstein 1988; Zywicki 2000; Rubin 2005). 
However, no systematic empirical evidence supports this claim. A related litera-
ture focuses on the dynamics of tort reforms and the drivers of certain types of 
reforms in the aggregate (Klick and Sharkey 2008; Miceli and Stone 2013) but 
omits interests specific to lawyers.
In this paper, we analyze whether lawyer-legislators are more likely than legis-
lators with different professional backgrounds to vote against tort reforms aimed 
at a reduction of the number and the size of tort cases. We do this by studying 
the voting behavior in Congress and 17 state legislatures between 1995 and 2014. 
The empirical analysis is based on a custom-made data set that we compiled us-
ing new computational techniques to draw information from the rich online re-
source from Project Vote Smart. We conduct the analysis separately for the fed-
eral and the state levels. On the basis of the econometric analysis of 14 votes on 
1 An introduction to the economic analysis of political selection is provided in Besley (2005). 
Analyses for specific professional groups focus on businessmen (Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya 
2010) and public servants (Braendle and Stutzer 2010, 2011). This research pursues a positive anal-
ysis, complementing older work (for example, Luce 1924) on the overrepresentation of specific pro-
fessional groups.
2 Our definition of a lawyer in this study is based on the professional background of a person and 
not only on his or her education. Someone who holds a degree from a law school but has never prac-
ticed law is not counted as a lawyer.
3 Estimates by the US Council of Economic Advisers (2004) are around 30 percent. However, 
when the benchmark for privately negotiated contingency fees of around one-third with “significant 
variation up and occasional variation down” (Eisenberg and Miller 2004, p. 35) and the additional 
defense costs are taken into account, 30 percent is a lower bound for the total fraction of tort fees 
going to lawyers.
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tort reform legislation, we find that the probability that attorneys at the federal 
level vote in favor of reforms is 7.3 percentage points lower than that of legisla-
tors with different professional backgrounds, ceteris paribus. Using 38 votes at 
the state level, we find that the probability for lawyer-legislators is 6.9 percentage 
points lower than for legislators with different professional backgrounds. At the 
federal level, the effect is slightly more pronounced for attorneys belonging to the 
Democratic Party than for those belonging to the Republican Party. In general, 
Republicans are more likely than Democrats to support reform bills that restrict 
liability. Finally, our analysis allows us to contribute to the question of whether 
the gender of legislators matters for the design of tort law. This question consid-
ers the suggested disproportionally negative impact of certain types of tort re-
forms on women (see Section 2). Indeed, female federal legislators are less likely 
than their male colleagues to support tort reforms that restrict liability, ceteris 
paribus.
In supplementary tests, we address a series of alternative explanations. First, 
we examine whether attorneys in politics consistently vote differently from non-
attorneys. We find neither evidence for a systematic and distinctive voting pat-
tern in a repeated random sample of votes on issues other than tort nor evidence 
that voting behavior can be explained by ideological differences using legislators’ 
roll call records. Second, we investigate whether lawyer-legislators’ voting behav-
ior caters to specific preferences of their electorate instead of being motivated by 
private interests. We do not find evidence for this refined median-voter hypoth-
esis. Restricting the sample to narrow races with one attorney candidate and one 
nonattorney candidate, we find a voting pattern similar to the overall pattern. 
Moreover, legislators in the House of Representatives who compete against attor-
neys in electoral races are not more likely to oppose restricting tort reforms than 
are legislators who face competitors with any other professional background. For 
a restricted sample of votes at the state level, we find some support that electoral 
incentives matter. Lawyer-legislators who face a binding term limit are more 
likely to vote in favor of an extension of tort law than are lawyer-legislators who 
can be reelected.
Throughout this study we conduct a positive politicoeconomic analysis. There-
fore, our contribution should not be interpreted as an assessment of the tort re-
form process from a welfare perspective. We do not discuss what kind of tort law 
regime might be preferable for citizens. We rather uncover microevidence on the 
underlying forces that are driving the tort reform process and shape law in gen-
eral.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first review the arguments 
that emphasize the role of lawyers in legislatures. We then derive the political 
economy hypothesis that lawyer-legislators are more likely than legislators with 
different professional backgrounds to oppose tort reforms. Section 3 describes 
the prerequisites for our empirical analysis: the data and the empirical strategy. 
The results for voting behavior at the federal and state levels are presented in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
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2. Lawyer-Legislators’ Interests in Tort Reforms
2.1. Lawyers in Legislatures
General sentiments about lawyer-legislators differ widely. On the one hand, 
there are concerns about the presence of lawyers in government going as far back 
as medieval England, where attorneys were temporarily banned from Parliament 
“because of their interest and activity in stirring up lawsuits” (Warren 1911, p. 
25; quoted in Roth and Roth 1989, p. 31). On the other hand, having legal skills 
is obviously an advantage when making laws. This is particularly the case for at-
torneys who hold offices or are members of committees related to the judicial 
system, as pointed out by Hain and Piereson (1975). Moreover, lawyers and pol-
iticians are members of the so-called talking professions (Norris and Lovenduski 
1995); hence, a law school graduate’s rhetorical skills are clearly advantageous in 
politics.
The presence of lawyers in legislatures is especially prominent in the United 
States. Around one-third of the members in the US House of Representa-
tives have professional backgrounds as attorneys, whereas the share of lawyer- 
legislators across state legislatures varies between 5 and 25 percent (in 2011; see 
Figure B1 in the online appendix).
The significant presence of attorneys in US politics has attracted the attention 
of the social sciences at least since de Tocqueville (1838, p. 260), who describes 
the lawyers in America as “the only enlightened class whom the people do not 
mistrust, [which is why] they are naturally called upon to occupy most of the 
public stations. They fill the legislative assemblies and are at the head of the ad-
ministration; they consequently exercise a powerful influence upon the forma-
tion of the law and upon its execution.” More recent work on lawyer- legislators 
focuses on their personal characteristics and attitudes as well as their motives 
for entering politics.4 On this basis, several theoretical suggestions concerning 
lawyer-legislators’ behavior and capabilities in office have been put forward. A 
prominent theory proposes that many lawyers already have a political career in 
mind when they choose to go to law school. They are aiming at high positions 
in the government or public services and enter the legislature to start their ca-
reers (Podmore 1977). This perspective suggests that lawyer-legislators act close 
to the preferences of their parties and the electorate to enhance their political 
careers. An opposing view comes from Schlesinger (1957), who argues that at-
torneys enter politics only for a short time period in order to boost their careers 
in private law practice. According to this perspective, lawyer-legislators are more 
likely than other legislators to act according to the policy preferences of the legal 
profession and/or the clients they are representing. Graves’s (1946) observation, 
4 Note that in this literature the term “lawyer-legislator” is sometimes used in a broader sense 
than how we define it. In the literature overview presented here, “lawyer-legislator” does, therefore, 
not exclusively refer to the professional background of a legislator. It might also refer to her or his 
educational background. However, we think that the theoretical arguments discussed in this section 
also hold for our more restrictive definition of a lawyer-legislator.
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that lawyer-legislators are too busy dealing with their legal services businesses to 
focus on important legislative matters, supports this point of view.
Other prevalent theories about lawyer-legislators’ behavior focus on a forma-
tive education at law schools and specific professional skills. Hyneman (1940, p. 
569) sees the attorney as an “accepted agent” of all political groups of the Ameri-
can people who represents the citizens in legislature in the same manner as clients 
in court. In a similar vein, Derge (1959, p. 432) describes the lawyer-legislator as 
an “intellectual jobber and contractor.” However, Derge also points out that the 
lawyer-legislator’s clients come from special interest groups rather than the pub-
lic in general. According to Graves (1946), the legal training at law schools makes 
lawyer-legislators rather conservative and likely to defend the status quo. Miller 
(1995, p. 27) adds that legal training leads to a strong “rule and rationality orien-
tation” that might threaten the political substance of lawyer-legislators’ work in 
office.
Unlike previous work on lawyer-legislators, we apply a political economics 
perspective. Lawyer-legislators—as all politicians—have individual preferences 
and goals that they pursue given their scope of action. Discretionary leeway in 
politics thereby emerges if reputation mechanisms are incomplete and no bind-
ing election promises are possible. To the extent that citizens do not fully know 
candidates’ preferences and positions on specific policy issues because these posi-
tions are secondary or not salient,5 voters cannot optimally elect policies as mod-
eled in the citizen-candidate framework (see Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Besley 
and Coate 1997). Instead, politicians’ individual preferences become key deter-
minants of policy choices (for evidence in Senate roll call votes, see Levitt 1996). 
This might involve their ideals of a productive law as well as more mundane pri-
vate advantages. As one aspect, lawyer-legislators might thus keep an eye on the 
prospects of increasing their expected incomes.
All members of a legislature can, of course, engage in politics catering to special 
interest groups with a view to receiving personal benefits in return (future earn-
ings or financial support for their campaigns). However, lawyer-legislators’ pri-
vate interests (in line with the interests of the legal services industry) are particu-
larly linked to the design of the law. Attorneys in the legislature can directly, and 
in various ways, influence the basis of their outside and future earnings.6 Some 
legislation has an influence on the demand for legal services, while other legis-
lation directly influences the prices of legal services (for a general account of the 
market for lawyers, see Hadfield 2000). The former refers to rules that provide 
incentives to resolve disputes in court and/or generate the need for legal advice in 
order to avoid becoming involved in litigation in the first place. A simple exam-
5 More recent work on the role of secondary policy issues and salience in election models include 
Besley and Coate (2003) and List and Sturm (2006).
6 Recently, politicians’ outside earnings and the trade-off with engagement in legislative work has 
received a lot of attention in political economics research. Theoretical considerations are formulated 
in Caselli and Morelli (2004), Besley (2005), and Mattozzi and Merlo (2008). Empirical evidence 
concerning politicians’ compensation, outside earnings, and effort in office is presented in Gagliar-
ducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2010).
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ple of this would be where the legal code is overly complex, provides numerous 
opportunities to litigate against natural or legal persons, and leads to substantial 
information asymmetry between attorneys and their clients (on complexity see, 
for example, White 1992). High prices for legal services can be achieved either 
directly by setting them by law or indirectly by easing antitrust laws to facilitate 
price fixing.7 Other drivers of prices are the procedural rules that define the ex-
tent to which attorneys are free to set up contingency-fee agreements.
2.2. Lawyer-Legislators and Tort Reforms
Many of the rules that have a considerable impact on the demand for legal ser-
vices can be found in US tort law. The tort system has doubtless become big busi-
ness for many lawyers ($265 billion in 2010). Whether the system is also bene-
ficial to consumers is discussed, and tort law has almost constantly been under 
reform pressure since the early 1980s (Sugarman 2002). In fact, by 2012 almost all 
state legislatures had passed one or several bills to change their mainly common-
law-based law of torts. More recently, tort reform has also become a federal issue, 
with several bills being passed by the House of Representatives.8 The majority of 
tort reforms aim to reduce the number of tort suits and the amount of damages 
awarded. Avraham (2007), investigating the effect of six different types of tort re-
forms on medical malpractice settlement payments, shows that some reforms in-
deed reduce the number of annual payments while others reduce average awards. 
The reforms thus reduce the demand for certain legal services, as suing becomes 
less attractive, and in some cases also reduce their price either directly by restrict-
ing contingency-fee agreements or indirectly by reducing potential contingency 
fees through damage caps. Lawyers’ associations clearly oppose these reforms 
(Rubin and Bailey 1994; Rubin 2005), and lawyer-legislators might be loyal rep-
resentatives of such special interest groups. The reforms also potentially reduce 
lawyer-legislators’ outside and future income, in particular if they are not full-
time legislators. But even full-time members of the US House of Representatives 
are likely to be affected by such reforms through their potential future income, 
taking into account that they are often elected for only 2 years. In addition, law-
yers as full-time legislators are likely to have close ties with colleagues in the legal 
7 Fixing prices for legal services is not unknown in the United States. Until the 1970s, the Amer-
ican Bar Association had been recommending minimal fees to its members. In 1974, the Supreme 
Court judged that practice to be price fixing and therefore a violation of the Sherman Act (Handberg 
1976).
8 Whether this reform process is indeed transforming the US tort system into a regime that is 
more beneficial for consumers is a controversial issue in the law and economics literature. If any 
opinions of scholars can be discerned, they are, at least in the early phase of the reform process, 
rather in favor of tort reforms (see Shapiro 1991). Aspects of tort liability are still controversially 
discussed by leading scholars without a clear consensus (see, for example, the prominent discussion 
about product liability in the Harvard Law Review between Polinsky and Shavell [2010a, 2010b] and 
Goldberg and Zimpursky [2010]). In this study, we do not discuss which type of tort system is pref-
erable from a welfare perspective. It is important to note, however, that given the state of the litera-
ture, lawyer-legislators (although experts in the law) are not expected to have superior knowledge. 
It is thus rather unlikely that lawyer-legislators vote systematically differently from other legislators.
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profession and/or be co-owners of a law firm. Attorneys in legislatures therefore 
have an incentive to prevent such reforms. They have many ways to do so. They 
can oppose or weaken tort reform legislation in the judiciary committee of their 
legislature. Another option is to actively organize opposition to the proposed bill, 
if necessary including logrolling. The most obvious action is to vote against it. 
Since the latter action is clearly observable, we propose the following hypothesis 
to empirically test the theoretical considerations.
Hypothesis 1. Legislators with professional backgrounds as attorneys vote 
against tort reforms that aim to reduce the number of suits and the amount of 
damages awarded with a higher probability than the average legislator with a dif-
ferent professional background.
In the few cases in which a bill on tort reform extends the liability, we expect, 
using the same theoretical considerations, lawyer-legislators to support it in the 
interest of their businesses.
The existing literature on lawyer-legislators’ voting behavior focuses on their 
educational backgrounds and does not directly test political economy hypothe-
ses. It rather explores differences in voting behavior between lawyers and other 
legislators across a broad range of issues without reaching a consistent conclu-
sion.9
2.3. Partisan Considerations and Women in the Legislature
With regard to voting on tort reform bills, the professional background of leg-
islators is of course not the only relevant factor. First, there is party affiliation. It 
has been argued that tort reform has become a highly partisan issue, with the Re-
publicans defending the interests of the business community in favor of reforms 
and the Democrats being pro-plaintiff and against reforms (Sugarman 2002). 
However, historically and ideologically the parties’ positions regarding tort re-
form are not clear (Sugarman 2006). According to Zywicki (2000), the Demo-
crats’ opposition to such reforms can partly be explained by generous campaign 
contributions from trial lawyers. Anecdotal evidence suggests, furthermore, that 
lawyer-legislators in the Democratic Party tend to be trial lawyers, whereas Re-
publican lawyer-legislators tend to be defense lawyers. We take this aspect into 
account by restricting the sample in some analyses to Democrats or Republicans 
only.
9 On the one hand, Dyer (1976) finds only a relatively small difference between lawyers and non-
lawyers in voting on no-fault insurance proposals in four state legislatures, while Engstrom and 
O’Connor (1980) find lawyer-legislators to be more supportive than nonlawyers of reforms that 
strengthen the legislative branch of government. On the other hand, Derge (1959, 1962), investi-
gating votes on bills concerning different social and economic issues in three state legislatures, finds 
no evidence of a systematically different voting behavior among lawyer-legislators and generally no 
tendency for lawyer- legislators to vote cohesively. Green et al. (1973, p. 450) investigate the voting 
behavior of lawyers in Congress on issues related to the US Supreme Court over the years 1937–68 
and conclude in the same vein as Derge that “the legal profession variable is justifiably branded as 
irrelevant.”
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Second, the gender of representatives might be of particular importance when 
studying voting behavior in the context of tort reforms. Research has shown that 
being a woman matters for policy outcomes and that women in legislatures have 
different voting patterns than men, especially if the votes are on issues concern-
ing children, families, or women.10 Even though tort law does not de jure treat 
women differently from men, it has been argued that it affects women de facto 
differently. In particular, scholars have hypothesized that caps on noneconomic 
damages have adverse effects on women and the elderly (Finley 2004, cited in 
Sharkey 2005). Women are likely to be awarded less in direct economic damages, 
because they either do not earn income or earn less. Damages for pain and suffer-
ing are therefore crucial for the total amount of damages they can receive. With 
noneconomic damages capped, attorneys might therefore “disproportionately 
screen out claims by women,” which makes it harder for women to claim any 
damages (Sharkey 2005, p. 490). Moreover, in the field of medical malpractice 
tort law, Rubin and Shepherd (2008) find that caps on noneconomic damages 
have a disproportionately positive effect on the non-motor-vehicle accidental 
death rates of women relative to those of men. Shepherd (2008) also finds evi-
dence for her hypothesis that restrictions on noneconomic damages and puni-
tive damages disproportionally reduce doctors’ care levels for women and that 
women at the same time benefit less from increases in doctors’ activity levels 
resulting from these reforms. Some of the votes analyzed in this paper concern 
medical malpractice issues.
3. Empirical Approach
3.1. Data
To test our hypothesis, we compiled a data set with the records from 64 votes 
on 48 different bills concerning tort law issues in 17 state legislatures and Con-
gress between 1995 and 2014.11 All 14 votes at the federal level concern bills that 
restrict liability. In that sense, they are typical tort reform bills, aimed at reducing 
the amount of damage payments and/or the number of tort cases, for example, by 
introducing caps on noneconomic damages. At the state level, 12 of the 50 votes 
concern bills that extend the existing tort liability, for instance by removing caps 
on noneconomic damages. Each voting record consists of a list of all members of 
the legislature and how they voted. Our dependent variable composed from these 
10 See Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) for women in politics and policy outcomes and Swers 
(2001) for an overview of female representatives’ behavior in state legislatures and Congress. In ad-
dition to the differential voting behavior of female representatives, Washington (2008) shows that, 
conditional on a congressperson’s number of children, having an additional daughter increases the 
representative’s propensity to cast votes that are more liberal, in particular on women’s issues.
11 The states included in our analysis are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, New Jersey, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin. The choice of these states is due to the data compilation process 
described in this section. The appendix presents data for all votes used in our study.
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voting records is equal to one if the representative voted yes (or pair yes) and zero 
if he or she voted no (or pair no).12
We linked these voting records to biographical information about each repre-
sentative’s professional background, party affiliation, gender, bar affiliation, age, 
and level of education. We take the latter two pieces of information into account 
to control for sociodemographic characteristics that are potentially correlated 
with voting behavior. Thereby, the variable Higher Education captures legislators 
with a college degree. In addition, we include an indicator variable that is equal to 
one if the legislator holds a degree from a law school (particularly, a JD, an SJD, 
an LLM, or an LLB) but neither has been working as an attorney nor is a member 
of a bar association. The covariates Attorney, Republican, Female, Nonattorney 
Bar Associate, and Higher Education are also coded as binary indicator variables.
We removed only 12 observations in federal voting records from the data set 
because of missing biographical data (Table B1 in the online appendix presents a 
complete accounting of the number of observations per vote). Biographical data 
for the members of state legislatures often lack dates of birth. We therefore ex-
clude the variable Age in our state-level analyses.13 We removed no voting records 
from the state-level sample because of missing biographical data. The adjusted 
data set thus consists of 5,255 observations from federal votes and 3,595 observa-
tions from state-level votes. These observations involve 1,413 lawyer- legislators 
in Congress and 383 lawyer-legislators in state legislatures. Table 1 presents some 
descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables, with votes and then legislators 
as the unit of observation.
Figure 1 provides a first impression of how the variables of interest are jointly 
distributed, which indicates support for the basic hypothesis. The width of the 
cells represents the relative share of the professional background categories, 
while the height of the cells indicates the proportion of votes in each category. 
The shading indicates the sign and magnitude of the Pearson residuals, which are 
used to conduct a D2 test of independence (P < 2.22E16). Federal and state-level 
votes on restricting reforms are included, and the raw difference in the share of 
yes votes amounts to −14.08 percentage points (= 47.91 percent − 61.99 percent). 
In summary, legislators with professional backgrounds as attorneys seem to be 
less likely to vote yes for reforms that potentially harm the legal services industry.
The finding in Figure 1 is not driven by partisan preferences, namely, that law-
yers are primarily Democrats opposing reforms. As reported in Table 2, the dif-
ference between lawyer-legislators and other representatives is instead found in 
both parties and at both levels.
Our data are drawn from Project Vote Smart’s website using the open-source 
12 Voteless members, such as delegates, and members who abstained from voting are excluded 
from the data set. Including absentees as legislators favoring the status quo (with the dependent 
variable equal to zero) does not meaningfully affect the results qualitatively or economically. Details 
of these alternative analyses are available on request.
13 However, we also checked for the robustness of the results when including Age and thereby los-
ing observations. The results remained qualitatively the same. Details for these analyses are available 
on request.
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interface pvsR (Matter and Stutzer 2015).14 In its online collection Project Vote 
Smart maintains data on candidates for and officials in public office in the United 
States, including legislators in Congress and state legislatures. It provides voting 
records on key votes, which are votes selected by a group of political scientists 
and journalists from all states. According to its website, the main criteria for this 
selection are the following:
1. The vote should be helpful in portraying how a member stands on a partic-
ular issue.
2. The vote should be clear for any person to understand.
3. The vote has received media attention.
4. The vote was passed or defeated by a very close margin.15
Usually all four criteria must be met.16 This helps to ensure that the votes we an-
alyze are, in a broad sense, of political relevance. Moreover, the nonpartisan se-
lection procedure of key votes is overseen by academics across the political spec-
trum and is completely independent of the authors of this study. This ensures 
that the sample of roll call votes analyzed here is not biased with respect to our 
14 The functions used to compile the data through Project Vote Smart’s application programming 
interface (VS API) were written in the R programming language. To make these methods accessible 
to a broader audience, the R package pvsR, which facilitates the compilation of data from the VS 
API for scientific analysis, is publicly available (see Matter 2013).
15 Project Vote Smart, 2015 All Key Votes (http://votesmart.org/bills).
16 In some cases, exceptions are made, for instance, if the margin was not close but the vote re-
ceived an unusual amount of coverage in the media.
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Federal State
No Yes Mean No Yes Mean
Vote level:
 Attorney 3,350 1,905 .36 2,982 613 .17
 Republican 2,509 2,746 .52 1,532 2,063 .57
 Female 4,591 664 .13 2,829 766 .21
 Higher Education 584 4,671 .89 1,041 2,554 .71
 Law Degreea 5,133 122 .02 3,555 40 .01
 Nonattorney Bar Associate 5,146 109 .02 3,576 19 .01
 Age 54.06
 DW-NOMINATE (first dimension) .09
Legislator level:
 Attorney 2,519 1,413 .36 1,813 383 .17
 Republican 1,905 2,027 .52 931 1,265 .58
 Female 3,415 517 .13 1,700 496 .23
 Higher Education 433 3,499 .89 651 1,545 .7
 Law Degreea 3,836 96 .02 2,167 29 .01
 Nonattorney Bar Associate 3,847 85 .02 2,182 14 .01
 Age 54.45
 DW-NOMINATE (first dimension) .08
a Not an attorney or member of a bar.
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hypothesis. In this pool of key bills, we used an algorithm to search each bill’s de-
scription for tort-law-related terms such as “tort,” “product liability,” and “medi-
cal malpractice.”17 The resulting list of votes was then checked manually to make 
sure that only votes clearly concerning tort reforms are included.18
Legislators’ characteristics were extracted from Project Vote Smart’s biograph-
ical records using a search algorithm similar to that used for the bills’ selection.19 
We coded a representative as having a professional background as an attorney if 
the section “Professional Experience” mentioned “attorney,” “lawyer,” “private 
17 In particular, we searched each bill’s title, described highlights, and synopsis. The search algo-
rithm and the tort-law-related terms can be found in the online appendix (algorithm B1 and Table 
B2).
18 In total, 39 votes identified by the automated search process were later removed during a man-
ual check. The main reason for exclusion was that the bill neither limited nor extended tort liability 
(for example, a bill that revises tax laws for small businesses and thereby also regulates how punitive 
damages can be taxed). Table B4 in the online appendix presents details about the excluded votes, 
including the reasons for exclusion.
19 Biographical data on candidates and officials in Project Vote Smart’s candidate profiles are 
based on a biographical form that each candidate fills out when running in a general election. Can-
didates or elected politicians can update this biographical form.
Figure 1. Votes by professional background
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law practice,” or “law firm.”20 The focus of our empirical analysis is thus on the 
occupation of attorney and not on the field of study. If a representative obtained 
a BA or a higher college degree, we define him or her as having a higher level of 
education. Variables capturing party affiliation, gender, age, bar admission, and 
law degrees are taken directly from the representatives’ biographical records.21
Our novel data compilation technique allows us to gain accurate biographi-
cal information about hundreds of representatives from different legislatures. 
This is generally a difficult task, because biographical data usually have several 
sources, each being differently structured. Furthermore, the method in which the 
information is collected supports its accuracy, since there are no obvious incen-
tives for representatives to strategically give incorrect information about them-
selves. The data are easily accessible through the Internet and thus are exposed to 
screening by political opponents and the media.
3.2. Empirical Strategy
We apply different estimation strategies to empirically test our hypothesis. For 
reasons of simplicity, we mainly present linear probability models estimated with 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Formally, such a model can be described 
as
 p P y E y xi i i i i i  ]  ]  a( ) ( ) ,1 x x C  (1)
where pi is the probability that representative i votes yes, yi is a dependent vari-
able describing the representative’s vote, xi is a vector of explanatory variables 
describing representative i, and C is the vector of regression coefficients. As some 
representatives vote several times in our sample, we use heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered at the individual level to test the statistical significance 
20 The search algorithm used to extract information from the biographical records and how it 
identified lawyer-legislators can be found in the online appendix (algorithm B2 and Table B3). In 
addition, we systematically improved the coding with extensive manual checks and additional man-
ual coding of special cases.
21 To determine (using Project Vote Smart’s biographical records) whether a legislator with a law 
degree has never practiced law is in some cases not straightforward (that is, some legislators men-
tion that they are cofounders or partners of a company without mentioning the company’s busi-
ness). We therefore cross-checked our data for all legislators that we identified as having law degrees 
but neither having professional backgrounds as attorneys nor being bar members. We considered a 
series of other data sources (such as the legislatures’ official websites, their Wikipedia entries, and 
the websites of firms they founded or worked for according to the biographical records).
Table 2
Support of Tort Reforms: Raw Differences in Voting Behavior
Federal Votes State Votes
Democrat Republican Democrat Republican
Lawyer-legislators .06 .93 .08 .87
Other legislators .12 .98 .11 .96
Difference −.06 −.05 −.03 −.09
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of the regression coefficients.22 The linear probability model has the advantage of 
permitting a straightforward interpretation of the coefficients: they can be read as 
marginal effects of the corresponding variables on the probability of voting yes. 
Moreover, the interaction effects that we include in some specifications would be 
difficult to estimate and interpret in a nonlinear model (see Ai and Norton [2003] 
for a short discussion of the issue). The downside of this approach is that model-
ing a probability in this manner results in misspecification in the sense that the 
estimated C values might imply probabilities that are greater than 1 or less than 0. 
We therefore additionally estimate a logit model in the following form:
 p P y Fi i i i i
i
  ]  a 
a
 a
( ) ( ) exp( )
exp( )
1
1
x x x
x
C
C
C
 (2)
Independently of the estimation approach, we control in a flexible way for the 
variation in unmeasured characteristics of the constituencies across states by in-
cluding state dummies in the pooled analysis at the federal level. We use state 
fixed effects to control for a state’s industry structure. Depending on the industry 
structure, one might well hypothesize that legislators support an extended tort 
system to redistribute damage awards from out-of-state industries to home-state 
consumers. Citizens in these states might also send more attorneys to Congress, 
which would lead to confounded estimates of the effect of a legislator’s profes-
sional background as an attorney on the probability of voting against a restriction 
of tort liability. Moreover, we control for bill fixed effects in all pooled analyses 
at the federal and state levels. In addition to accounting for distinct legal aspects 
of certain bills (and the state in the case of state-level votes), the inclusion of bill 
fixed effects also controls for the timing of the bills and the votes. At the state 
level, we include bill fixed effects to take into account that attorneys in state leg-
islatures with many lawyer-legislators might support reforms less than their co- 
legislators but still generally more then lawyer-legislators in states where lawyer- 
legislators form a small minority. Without bill fixed effects, this constellation 
might spuriously lead to a reverse effect.
The default maximum likelihood estimation of different specifications of equa-
tion (2) based on our data set implies, in some cases, a nonidentifiability prob-
lem due to complete separation. The separation arises because some explanatory 
variables (or linear combinations of them) are perfectly predictive of voting yes 
or no. For example, at the federal level, the sole representative of Alaska always 
voted yes; hence, the state indicator Alaska is a perfect predictor of voting yes. 
Nonidentifiability due to (quasi-)complete separation in the data is well known 
in the econometrics literature; it is, however, often ignored in applied research. 
Similar to the problem of multicollinearity, the separation problem leads to es-
22 In addition, we cross-checked our results for both the federal and the state level by reestimating 
our main specifications on samples that contain each legislator only once. This ensures that we do 
not overestimate the statistical significance of the findings because of repeated votes by the same 
individuals. The results of these additional analyses were qualitatively very similar to our baseline 
results and are available on request.
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sentially meaningless results (maximum likelihood estimates from a logit model 
with [quasi-]complete separation are simply a function of the iteration proce-
dure). It could be argued that removing observations of Alaska’s representative 
from the sample is a reasonable approach to dealing with this problem (but it 
would mean removing potentially important information from the sample). 
However, the problem also arises in some estimations using individuals’ charac-
teristics (for instance, because in some votes at the state level all attorneys voted 
against the reform). Removing these observations from the sample is for obvious 
reasons not a sound solution to the separation problem. To overcome this prob-
lem, we apply the approach suggested in Gelman et al. (2008) to estimate the co-
efficients of the logit models.23 The estimated coefficients can be interpreted like 
those from the usual logit model. For several of them, we calculate discrete effects 
on the probability of voting in favor of a reform.24 This facilitates their interpreta-
tion and allows a comparison with the OLS estimates. We report discrete effects 
as the mean of all individual differences in predicted probabilities in the sample. 
For all observations we thus set Attorney equal to one and then to zero, comput-
ing the predicted probability of voting yes for both cases and averaging over all 
the differences between the two predicted probabilities of voting yes. Formally, 
this can be expressed as
 
1
1 ˆ ˆ[ ( 1) ( 0)],
n
i il i il
i
F x F x
n 
a a]   ]  C Cx x   (3)
where F denotes the cumulative density function of the logistic distribution, xi is 
a vector of explanatory variables describing observation i, C is a vector of the esti-
23 Gelman et al. (2008, p. 1363) present a default logistic model for routine use by applied re-
searchers that is “better than the unstable estimates produced by the current default—maximum 
likelihood.” The method of Gelman et al. (2008) is essentially an adoption of the classical maximum 
likelihood algorithm and assigns independent Cauchy prior distributions to all logistic regression 
coefficients with center 0 and scale set to 2.5 to coefficients of binary predictors, 2.5/(2 × standard 
deviation of the numerical predictor) to coefficients of numerical predictors, and scale 10 to the 
constant term. Like the default maximum likelihood estimator for logit models, this alternative al-
gorithm computes point estimates and standard errors. The method is, however, robust to (quasi-)
complete separation and thus produces always meaningful results. Gelman et al. (2008) demonstrate 
the effectiveness of their method with a model predicting the probability of a Republican vote for 
president depending on a voter’s demographic characteristics. In cases in which no complete sepa-
ration exists in our analyses and estimation using default maximum likelihood regression is feasible, 
we cross-check the coefficients obtained from Gelman et al.’s method with those estimated with 
default maximum likelihood regression. The results are qualitatively the same and often close to nu-
merically identical. For reasons of simplicity, we therefore present in all applications of logit models 
in this study only the coefficients estimated with the robust method.
24 We favor discrete effects over marginal effects for two reasons. First, applying the partial deriv-
ative formula to estimate marginal changes in probabilities in a logit model can yield nonsensical 
results that violate the rule that probabilities should sum to 1 (Caudill and Jackson 1989). Second, in 
our setting the explanatory variables of most interest are all binary, and computing the effect of an 
infinitesimal change of such variables can be highly inaccurate (Winkelmann and Boes 2006) and, 
with regard to content, inappropriate (namely, the effect of an infinitesimal change in having a pro-
fessional background as an attorney).
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mated coefficients, and xil is the indicator variable of interest (such as Attorney).25 
Using our empirical strategy, we first analyze attorneys’ differential voting behav-
ior. We then discuss a series of robustness checks and complementary tests of the 
private-interest hypothesis.
4. Results
We present our main results separately for reform bills at the federal and state 
levels. In addition, we present federal-level estimations based on subsamples con-
taining only Democrats or Republicans. We primarily test whether attorneys are 
statistically significantly less likely than nonattorneys to vote for reforms that re-
strict tort litigation (or more likely to support extensions of tort law). Our focus 
is on estimates based on pooled data from many votes. However, we also estimate 
results for single votes to check whether the general findings are driven by one or 
very few of the votes. In complementary analyses, we test alternative explanations 
and simulate voting results assuming a strict recusal rule.
4.1. Tort Reform Bills at the Federal Level
Table 3 presents the results based on 12 votes on bills in the House of Repre-
sentatives and two votes in the Senate. All estimations include state and bill fixed 
effects. According to the OLS estimation in specification (1), attorneys are 7.3 
percentage points less likely than nonattorneys to vote in favor of reforms. The 
effect is highly statistically significant and supports the hypothesis that lawyer- 
legislators exhibit a distinct voting behavior that is in line with the profession’s 
business interest. The effect holds, ceteris paribus. In particular, Republicans are 
around 84.6 percentage points more likely than Democrats to support reform 
bills. Moreover, female legislators are less likely than their male colleagues to sup-
port tort reforms. (The estimated coefficient is −3.5 percentage points.) No sta-
tistically different voting behavior is observed for older people or those with a 
higher level of education. Interestingly, legislators who have a degree from a law 
school but are not practicing law are not less likely to support reforms. While the 
finding has to be put in perspective given the sample of 122 votes from 29 repre-
sentatives, it suggests that studying law does not generally motivate legislators to 
vote against reforms.
The reestimation of the baseline model using a logit regression indicates that 
the main findings are robust to the estimation method. As the logit coefficients 
cannot be interpreted directly, we report effects calculated as the mean of all dis-
crete differences in probabilities in our sample.26 While the baseline probability 
that nonattorneys will support reform bills is .572, the probability is .504, or 6.8 
25 On the basis of the arguments presented in Hanmer and Kalkan (2013), we prefer this approach 
over presenting discrete effects for a typical (average) observation. To make our results fully compa-
rable with other studies, we also report for our main results the size of discrete effects for the average 
observation.
26 Figure B2 in the online appendix illustrates how the individual discrete effects are distributed 
in our samples.
7KLVFRQWHQWGRZQORDGHGIURPRQ)HEUXDU\$0
$OOXVHVXEMHFWWR8QLYHUVLW\RI&KLFDJR3UHVV7HUPVDQG&RQGLWLRQVKWWSZZZMRXUQDOVXFKLFDJRHGXWDQGF
372 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS
percentage points lower, for attorneys. The difference between Republicans and 
Democrats is 84.7 percentage points. Associates of the bar for whom no law prac-
tice is observed (Nonattorney Bar Associates) follow attorneys in their voting be-
havior. According to the logit specification, the votes of attorneys and their fellow 
interest group members are thus aligned. Finally, female legislators are 2.7 per-
centage points less likely than male legislators to support tort reforms according 
to this alternative estimation approach.27 In two additional specifications, we es-
timated OLS models separately for samples of Democrats and Republicans. The 
results indicate that the voting behavior of attorneys in both parties deviates sys-
tematically from that of their fellow members. The estimated coefficients of −7.0 
27 Discrete effects based on the average observation are substantially larger. According to this al-
ternative measure, the difference in the probability of voting in support of a reform bill is −29.85 
percentage points for attorneys, 91.51 percentage points for Republicans, and −12.45 percentage 
points for women.
Table 3
Federal Tort Reform Votes by Sample
All Legislators Democrats Republicans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept .163** −1.926** .384** 1.132**
(3.057) (−3.346) (5.953) (19.743)
Attorney −.073** −1.285** −.070** −.063**
(−5.291) (−8.872) (−5.786) (−7.428)
Republican .846** 6.415**
(57.536) (37.269)
Female −.035* −.521* −.039* −.000
(−2.180) (−2.571) (−2.489) (−.013)
Higher Education −.007 −.169 −.011 .002
(−.364) (−.819) (−.597) (.159)
Age/10 −.008 −.152* .000 −.014**
(−1.276) (−2.323) (.013) (−3.591)
Law Degreea −.025 −.212 −.091* .038+
(−1.250) (−.481) (−2.162) (1.650)
Nonattorney Bar Associate −.055 −1.098** −.020 −.135**
(−.790) (−2.586) (−.549) (−4.687)
N 5,255 5,255 2,509 2,746
R2 .772 .206 .079
McFadden’s R2 .729
Method OLS Logit OLS OLS
Note. Values are the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) or logit specifications using pooled data. Stan-
dard errors of the OLS specifications are clustered at the individual level; t-values (OLS) or z-values (logit) 
are in parentheses. The dependent variable is a vote in favor of reform. The logit models are estimated with 
the method suggested by Gelman et al. (2008) to avoid the separation problem that would occur with the 
default maximum likelihood estimator. All specifications include state and bill fixed effects.
a Not an attorney or member of a bar.
+ p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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percentage points for Democrats and −6.3 percentage points for Republicans are 
of similar magnitude.28
Tables B5 and B6 in the online appendix show that the findings for the pooled 
data are not driven by single votes. For 13 of the 14 bills at the federal level, we 
find that attorneys are less likely than nonattorneys to support them. In seven 
cases, the partial correlation is also statistically significant. For the variable for 
party affiliation, we find strong positive effects for Republicans throughout. For 
female legislators, the estimated support of reforms is statistically significantly 
lower than for male legislators in seven cases.
4.2. Tort Reform Bills at the State Level
Results for state-level tort reforms based on pooled data are presented in Table 
4. The baseline specification shows similar results for the state and federal levels. 
28 If instead an interaction term between Attorney and party affiliation is included, the baseline 
effect for attorneys from the Democratic Party is −.066 (t = −3.24), and the linear combination for 
Republican attorneys is −.079 (t = −7.41).
Table 4
State-Level Tort Reform Votes by Type of Bill
Restricting Tort Law Extending Tort Law
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept .102** −2.805** .968** 3.025**
(6.663) (−7.749) (11.126) (5.764)
Attorney −.069** −1.180** .079* 1.099**
(−4.435) (−5.026) (2.256) (3.055)
Republican .837** 6.575** −.826** −5.310**
(72.219) (25.469) (−34.273) (−17.168)
Female .004 .014 .060** .840*
(.306) (.067) (3.041) (2.547)
Higher Education .012 .263 −.000 .039
(1.037) (1.367) (−.005) (.136)
Law Degreea −.035 −.528 .049 .453
(−.637) (−.666) (.359) (.409)
Nonattorney Bar Associate −.080+ −1.017 .171 1.640+
(−1.851) (−.843) (.945) (1.855)
N 2,742 2,742 853 853
R2 .744 .699 .632
McFadden’s R2 .711
Method OLS Logit OLS Logit
Note. Values are the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) or logit specifications using pooled data. Stan-
dard errors of the OLS specifications are clustered at the individual level; t-values (OLS) or z-values (logit) 
are in parentheses. The dependent variable is a vote in favor of reform. The logit models are estimated with 
the method suggested by Gelman et al. (2008) to avoid the separation problem that would occur with the 
default maximum likelihood estimator. All specifications include bill fixed effects. Legislators’ ages are not 
available at the state level.
a Not an attorney or member of a bar.
+ p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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Attorneys are less likely than nonattorneys to support bills that restrict tort law. 
The estimated statistically significant effect is −6.9 percentage points. Republicans 
are 83.7 percentage points more likely than Democrats to support restricting re-
forms. Unlike at the federal level, female legislators do not vote significantly dif-
ferently from male legislators. Level of education seems also not to make a differ-
ence for voting on tort issues.
The main results hold if the theoretically more appropriate logit estimator is 
used. According to the discrete effects based on the coefficients in specification 
(2), attorneys are on average 6.7 percentage points less likely and Republicans are 
83.6 percentage points more likely than nonattorneys and Democrats to support 
restricting tort reforms at the state level.
For the 12 votes on bills that proposed an extension of tort law at the state level, 
the results in specifications (3) and (4) reveal an inversion of the partial correla-
tions consistent with the central hypothesis of our study. The coefficients of the 
linear model indicate that attorneys are 7.9 percentage points more likely than 
nonattorneys to support an extension of tort law. The probability that Republi-
cans support it is 82.6 percentage points lower than that of Democrats. Consis-
tent with the idea that women benefit relatively more from an extended tort law, 
results for female legislators indicate increased support by 6.0 percentage points. 
The effects based on the logit model in specification (4) are all qualitatively the 
same and quantitatively very similar.29
The generality of the main result for attorneys across individual votes at the 
state level is presented in Figure 2. Attorney coefficients from linear models in-
dividually estimated for each of the roll call votes at the state level are plotted 
29 The effects computed for the average observation are again larger. In the case of restricting re-
forms at the state level, the difference in the probability of voting in support of a reform bill is −22.54 
percentage points for attorneys and 91.36 percentage points for Republicans. In the case of extend-
ing reforms, the difference in the probability of voting in support of a reform bill is 22.63 percent-
age points for attorneys, −86.73 percentage points for Republicans, and 18.19 percentage points for 
female legislators.
Figure 2. Distribution of marginal effects for the variable Attorney for individual state-level 
votes.
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separately for 12 bills that involve an extension and for 38 bills that involve a 
restriction of tort law. The distribution of the marginal effects clearly shows that 
for extensions of tort law, support by attorneys is identical or higher in all but one 
case. For bills that proposed a restriction of tort law, attorneys in most cases are 
less likely than nonattorneys to vote yes. There are only five cases in which the 
effect is small and positive (but none are statistically significant). These results 
are not only congruent with our hypothesis that lawyer-legislators vote on tort 
issues in favor of the legal services business, but they also contradict the prevalent 
theory that lawyer-legislators’ actions in office are conservative and mainly aimed 
at defending the status quo. Even though the lawyer-legislators’ voting on typical 
bills restricting tort liability might be interpreted as a preference toward the sta-
tus quo, this does not at all hold for bills that extend tort liability.
4.3. Hypothetical Voting Results Assuming a Strict Recusal Rule for Attorneys
To provide an assessment of the material importance of attorneys’ voting 
behavior (being indicative of their influence on committees and the legislative 
process in general), we conduct an exploratory simulation of the possible vote 
outcomes if there were a strict recusal rule applied to attorneys for legislation in-
volving tort law (see the online appendix for some further comments and data). 
Thereby, we have to ignore reactions and dynamics resulting from a strict recusal 
rule. While at the federal level, the outcomes for the 10 bills that passed would 
not have been different, at the state level outcomes would have been different: 37 
instead of 35 (of the 38) bills that restrict tort law would have passed. With regard 
to bills that extended tort law, only 9 of the 12 reform bills would have been ap-
proved. Lawyer- legislators thus were pivotal in five of 50 cases at the state level.
4.4. Tests of Alternative Explanations
The results shown above clearly indicate that lawyer-legislators’ voting on tort 
issues is distinct from that of legislators with different professional backgrounds. 
The partially differential voting behavior of legislators with a law degree, but not 
practicing law, moreover suggests that lawyer-legislators’ voting behavior can-
not simply be ascribed to their superior knowledge of the law. Instead of reflect-
ing private interests, the results may, however, also come about because lawyer- 
legislators vote differently in general or cater to their constituents. We explore 
these alternative explanations in supplementary analyses (described in detail in 
the online appendix) and present here a summary of the findings.
Are Lawyer-Legislators Simply Different? Attorneys might generally vote dif-
ferently from other legislators on various issues including tort law. While such an 
explanation runs counter to the existing empirical literature on the general voting 
behavior of lawyer-legislators (as discussed in Section 2.2), we directly confront 
it with our data. First, we analyze whether lawyer-legislators vote systematically 
differently on various other bills by a magnitude similar to that observed for tort 
reforms. For this, we consecutively draw 200 samples at the federal and state lev-
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els using a random selection of bills included in Project Vote Smart’s data and es-
timate our logit baseline specifications (as in Tables 3 and 4). The results indicate 
that it is possible to obtain some statistically significant coefficients for attorneys 
in arbitrary sets of votes on various issues. The size and statistical significance of 
the coefficients, however, never come close to those of the coefficients in our orig-
inal analyses. The voting behavior of lawyer-legislators that we observe in votes 
on tort law issues thus cannot be explained by lawyer-legislators voting differ-
ently in general.
Second, we test whether the difference in voting behavior can be statistically 
accounted for by lawyer-legislators’ full roll call records. The stance on tort re-
forms might reflect a general political orientation that characterizes lawyer- 
legislators independent of their specific business interests. Accordingly, we in-
clude the well-known DW-NOMINATE roll call measure as a proxy for ideology 
in our specifications at the federal level. The OLS results indicate that legislators 
who are 1 standard deviation more conservative than average support a restrict-
ing tort reform proposal with a probability that is 21.1 percentage points higher 
(statistically significant at the 1 percent level).30 Moreover, the indicator Attor-
ney remains an important explanatory factor both in magnitude and in statistical 
significance. In the OLS estimation, the effect amounts to 6.1 percentage points 
(relative to the 7.3 percentage points in the baseline estimation in Table 3). The 
difference in lawyer-legislators’ voting on tort issues thus cannot be statistically 
accounted for by their full roll call records.
Third, we study whether the voting pattern is more pronounced for lawyer- 
legislators who indicate recent activity as attorneys than for those who practiced 
less recently. Evidence in this direction might suggest that differences in voting 
behavior are due to business interests. Accordingly, we divide the attorneys into 
two groups: those mentioning occupation as attorney as the most recent profes-
sional activity in their biographical records and those mentioning any occupation 
as attorney either longer ago or not as the primary occupation. While recently ac-
tive attorneys are 7.7 percentage points more likely than nonattorneys to support 
an extended tort law, the effect for the other attorneys is 4.4 percentage points. 
This pattern fits the interpretation that it is private economic interest rather than 
a generally higher faith in the tort system that drives the differential voting be-
havior.
Do Lawyer-Legislators Follow Voter Preferences? Whether attorneys in poli-
tics happen to cater with their voting decisions to voter preferences opposing tort 
reforms independent of their private interests is inherently difficult to judge. In 
our empirical analysis of Congress, we control in a most flexible way for varia-
tion in tort-specific policy preferences across states and include state fixed effects. 
However, there might still be specific voter preferences reflected in the election 
30 The gender difference is no longer sizable and statistically significant when controlling for leg-
islators’ full roll call records. This suggests that there are no gender-specific effects on voting on tort 
reforms that go beyond what is captured in such an ideology measure (reflecting women legislators’ 
generally more liberal positions).
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of an attorney that characterize an electoral district independent of, for instance, 
general ideology. We use three tests to approach this alternative explanation. 
First, using the idea of narrow election results exploited in regression disconti-
nuity designs such as in Lee (2001), we compare the voting behavior of lawyer- 
legislators who won election against nonattorney candidates with the voting be-
havior of nonattorneys who won election against attorney candidates by narrow 
margins. If these constellations capture similar underlying voter preferences, no 
systematic difference in voting patterns on tort reforms is expected. However, 
the estimation results reveal a highly statistically (and economically) significant 
negative effect for attorneys in all of the specifications. This evidence suggests that 
our findings are not driven by differences in voter preferences.
Second, in a similar test, we ask whether nonattorneys facing attorney chal-
lengers are less likely to vote in favor of restricting tort reforms. In particular, this 
is presumed to be the case if an election was won by a small margin, which indi-
cates that the candidates had positioned themselves ideologically close to each 
other. However, we do not find any evidence supporting this alternative expla-
nation. For legislators running against attorneys, a small statistically insignificant 
partial correlation is observed that is driven not by the close races but by those 
with clear nonattorney winners.
Third, in an illustrative analysis, we explore whether lawyer-legislators vote dif-
ferently when not facing reelection incentives because of term limits. Using data 
from the four states in our data set with lifetime term limits, we find a small sta-
tistically insignificant positive effect of 4.1 percentage points for attorneys who 
can run again and a large statistically significant positive effect of 6.8 percentage 
points for attorneys who face a binding term limit. The illustrative evidence is 
consistent with a refined hypothesis that the pursuit of private interests is more 
likely when facing weaker electoral incentives. In addition, the phenomenon of 
attorneys’ voting behavior overall cannot be explained by specific voter prefer-
ences.
5. Concluding Remarks
Attorneys elected to Congress and to state legislatures are systematically less 
likely than nonattorneys to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation 
but are more likely to support bills that extend tort law. This finding is based on 
an analysis of 14 votes at the federal level and 50 votes at the state level (or 8,850 
decisions of individual legislators) between 1995 and 2014. The empirical reg-
ularity is consistent with our hypothesis that lawyer-legislators, at least in part, 
vote in line with attorneys’ business interests when they vote on tort issues. A 
set of alternative explanations is explored that, however, cannot account for the 
observed pattern in voting behavior. In addition, we find that legislators from 
the Republican Party are more in favor of restricting tort law. Finally, women in 
Congress support restricting tort reform bills systematically less than men, ceteris 
paribus. This difference, however, can be accounted for by their individual roll 
call records on other bills as captured in a measure of ideology.
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In a broader perspective, our findings highlight the relevance of legislators’ 
identities and individual professional interests for economic policy making. Leg-
islatures should thus not be understood solely as platforms where policy pref-
erences of constituents and special interest groups are balanced. It matters how 
institutions shape incentives for citizens to pursue a political career and for par-
ties to nominate candidates with particular characteristics. In our context, insti-
tutional factors that narrow the lawyer-legislators’ discretionary scope of action 
and/or affect the demand and supply of lawyers for political mandates might well 
affect the substance of tort law. Recusal rules and ethics laws in general aimed at 
limiting lawyer-legislators’ conflicts of interest are in force in Congress and many 
state legislatures, but their merit and effectiveness is far from clear (Carpinello 
1989). Furthermore, little is known about the institutional determinants of the 
representation of lawyers in politics (for an exception, see Rosenson 2006).
Our work suggests further research in at least two directions. First, in terms 
of methods, we believe that data from souerces such as Project Vote Smart of-
fer great potential for quantitative research (or data-driven computational social 
science; see Lazer et al. 2009) in areas such as political economics, political sci-
ence, and empirical legal studies. The data allow fully reproducible research in 
terms of data collection, data editing, and data analysis. Studies can relatively eas-
ily be replicated and extended with additional waves of data such as new voting 
records. Moreover, new opportunities arise for combining accurate data sources 
on individual politicians’ behavior and their identities. Second, in terms of sub-
stance, it might be worthwhile to further explore tort law as endogenous to the 
political process. What are the determinants of tort reforms? This might help to 
disentangle economic outcomes attributed to tort law from underlying political 
forces.
7KLVFRQWHQWGRZQORDGHGIURPRQ)HEUXDU\$0
$OOXVHVXEMHFWWR8QLYHUVLW\RI&KLFDJR3UHVV7HUPVDQG&RQGLWLRQVKWWSZZZMRXUQDOVXFKLFDJRHGXWDQGF
A
pp
en
di
x
Ta
bl
e 
A
1
A
na
ly
ze
d 
Vo
te
s
Re
gi
on
 
 
D
at
e
 B
ill
 N
um
be
r
Ti
tle
Ye
s/
N
o
 
 
 
To
rt
 L
aw
Li
ab
ili
ty
N
at
io
na
l
O
ct
ob
er
 5
, 1
99
5
H
.R
. 9
56
Pr
od
uc
t L
ia
bi
lit
y 
Bi
ll
61
/3
7
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
O
ct
ob
er
 1
9,
 1
99
5
H
.R
. 2
42
5
M
ed
ic
ar
e P
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
A
ct
 o
f 1
99
5
23
1/
20
1
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
M
ar
ch
 2
1,
 1
99
6
H
.R
. 9
56
Pr
od
uc
t L
ia
bi
lit
y 
Bi
ll
59
/4
0
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
M
ar
ch
 3
, 1
99
6
H
.R
. 3
10
3
H
ea
lth
 In
su
ra
nc
e P
or
ta
bi
lit
y 
Bi
ll
26
7/
15
1
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
M
ar
ch
 2
9,
 1
99
6
H
.R
. 9
56
Pr
od
uc
t L
ia
bi
lit
y 
Bi
ll
25
9/
15
8
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
M
ay
 9
, 1
99
6
H
.R
. 9
56
Pr
od
uc
t L
ia
bi
lit
y 
Bi
ll
25
8/
16
3
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
Ju
ly
 2
4,
 1
99
8
H
.R
. 4
25
0
Pa
tie
nt
 P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
Bi
ll
21
6/
21
0
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
Fe
br
ua
ry
 1
6,
 2
00
0
H
.R
. 2
36
6
Sm
al
l B
us
in
es
s L
ia
bi
lit
y 
Re
fo
rm
 B
ill
22
1/
19
3
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
A
ug
us
t 2
, 2
00
1
H
.A
m
dt
. 3
03
A
m
en
dm
en
t t
o 
th
e B
ip
ar
tis
an
 P
at
ie
nt
 
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
A
ct
21
8/
21
3
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
M
ar
ch
 1
3,
 2
00
3
H
.R
. 5
M
al
pr
ac
tic
e L
ia
bi
lit
y 
Bi
ll
22
9/
19
6
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
M
ay
 1
2,
 2
00
4
H
.R
. 4
28
0
M
ed
ic
al
 M
al
pr
ac
tic
e L
ia
bi
lit
y 
Li
m
ita
tio
n 
Bi
ll
22
9/
19
7
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
Se
pt
em
be
r 1
4,
 2
00
4
H
.R
. 4
57
1
La
w
su
it 
A
bu
se
 R
ed
uc
tio
n 
A
ct
 o
f 2
00
4
22
9/
17
4
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
Ju
ly
 2
8,
 2
00
5
H
.R
. 5
M
al
pr
ac
tic
e L
ia
bi
lit
y 
Re
fo
rm
 B
ill
23
0/
19
4
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
at
io
na
l
N
ov
em
be
r 7
, 2
00
9
H
.A
m
dt
. 5
10
Su
bs
tit
ut
e H
ea
lth
 C
ar
e a
nd
 In
su
ra
nc
e L
aw
 
A
m
en
dm
en
ts
17
6/
25
8
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
A
Z
Ja
nu
ar
y 
29
, 2
00
7
S.
B.
 1
03
2
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
Ro
om
 M
al
pr
ac
tic
e
16
/1
2
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
A
Z
M
ay
 1
0,
 2
00
7
S.
B.
 1
03
2
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
Ro
om
 M
al
pr
ac
tic
e
26
/2
9
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
A
Z
A
pr
il 
6,
 2
01
1
H
.B
. 2
19
1
Pu
ni
tiv
e D
am
ag
e A
w
ar
ds
21
/8
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
A
Z
A
pr
il 
11
, 2
01
1
H
.B
. 2
19
1
Pu
ni
tiv
e D
am
ag
e A
w
ar
ds
41
/1
7
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
A
Z
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
8,
 2
01
2
S.
B.
 1
33
6
Li
m
iti
ng
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r E
lig
ib
ili
ty
 fo
r 
Pu
ni
tiv
e D
am
ag
es
19
/1
1
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Re
str
ic
te
d
A
Z
M
ar
ch
 6
, 2
01
2
S.
B.
 1
35
9
Pr
oh
ib
its
 W
ro
ng
fu
l B
irt
h 
La
w
su
its
20
/9
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
7KLVFRQWHQWGRZQORDGHGIURPRQ)HEUXDU\$0
$OOXVHVXEMHFWWR8QLYHUVLW\RI&KLFDJR3UHVV7HUPVDQG&RQGLWLRQVKWWSZZZMRXUQDOVXFKLFDJRHGXWDQGF
380
CO
M
ar
ch
 3
, 2
00
8
S.
B.
 1
64
In
cr
ea
sin
g 
Ca
ps
 o
n 
M
ed
ic
al
 M
al
pr
ac
tic
e 
La
w
su
its
18
/1
6
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Ex
te
nd
ed
FL
M
ar
ch
 1
6,
 2
00
6
H
.B
. 1
45
Jo
in
t a
nd
 S
ev
er
al
 L
ia
bi
lit
y 
El
im
in
at
io
n
93
/2
7
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
FL
M
ar
ch
 3
0,
 2
00
6
H
.B
. 1
45
Jo
in
t a
nd
 S
ev
er
al
 L
ia
bi
lit
y 
El
im
in
at
io
n
27
/1
3
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
FL
M
ay
 1
, 2
00
9
H
.B
. 9
03
Ca
pp
in
g 
A
tto
rn
ey
 F
ee
s i
n 
W
or
ke
rs
’ 
Co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
La
w
su
its
22
/1
6
W
or
ke
r c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n
Re
str
ic
te
d
FL
M
ar
ch
 9
, 2
01
2
H
.B
. 1
19
A
m
en
ds
 P
er
so
na
l I
nj
ur
y 
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
In
su
ra
nc
e R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts 
an
d 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
85
/3
0
M
ot
or
 v
eh
ic
le
Re
str
ic
te
d
IL
A
pr
il 
27
, 2
00
7
H
.B
. 1
79
8
W
ro
ng
fu
l D
ea
th
 D
am
ag
es
63
/5
2
W
ro
ng
fu
l d
ea
th
 g
en
er
al
Ex
te
nd
ed
IL
M
ay
 1
7,
 2
00
7
H
.B
. 1
79
8
W
ro
ng
fu
l D
ea
th
 D
am
ag
es
31
/2
W
ro
ng
fu
l d
ea
th
 g
en
er
al
Ex
te
nd
ed
KS
M
ar
ch
 1
5,
 2
00
7
H
.B
. 2
53
0
Ph
ys
ic
ia
n 
Li
ab
ili
ty
 E
xe
m
pt
io
n
10
9/
1
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
KS
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
8,
 2
01
3
S.
B.
 1
42
Pr
oh
ib
its
 C
iv
il 
A
ct
io
n 
La
w
su
its
 co
nc
er
ni
ng
 
A
bo
rt
io
n 
Co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n
34
/5
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
LA
Ju
ne
 7
, 2
01
0
S.
B.
 7
31
A
ut
ho
riz
in
g 
A
tto
rn
ey
 G
en
er
al
 C
on
tin
ge
nc
y 
Fe
e C
on
tr
ac
ts
21
/1
6
G
en
er
al
Ex
te
nd
ed
M
I
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
2,
 2
00
7
H
.B
. 4
04
4
Re
pe
al
in
g 
D
ru
g 
Co
m
pa
ny
 L
ia
bi
lit
y 
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n
70
/3
9
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Ex
te
nd
ed
M
I
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
2,
 2
00
7
H
.B
. 4
04
5
Re
tr
oa
ct
iv
e D
ru
g 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r L
ia
bi
lit
y
60
/4
9
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Ex
te
nd
ed
M
I
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
2,
 2
00
7
H
.B
. 4
04
6
Ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
 C
om
pa
ny
 L
ia
bi
lit
y
58
/4
9
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Ex
te
nd
ed
M
I
M
ar
ch
 2
6,
 2
00
9
H
.B
. 4
31
7
Ex
te
nd
in
g 
Ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
Li
ab
ili
ty
56
/5
3
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Ex
te
nd
ed
M
O
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
8,
 2
01
2
S.
B.
 5
92
Es
ta
bl
ish
es
 N
ew
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 to
 P
ro
ve
 
W
or
kp
la
ce
 D
isc
rim
in
at
io
n
25
/8
W
or
kp
la
ce
 d
isc
rim
in
at
io
n
Re
str
ic
te
d
M
O
Fe
br
ua
ry
 9
, 2
01
2
H
.B
. 1
21
9
W
or
kp
la
ce
 D
isc
rim
in
at
io
n 
A
m
en
dm
en
ts
89
/6
8
W
or
kp
la
ce
 d
isc
rim
in
at
io
n
Re
str
ic
te
d
M
O
M
ar
ch
 8
, 2
01
2
H
.B
. 1
21
9
W
or
kp
la
ce
 D
isc
rim
in
at
io
n 
A
m
en
dm
en
ts
23
/8
W
or
kp
la
ce
 d
isc
rim
in
at
io
n
Re
str
ic
te
d
M
O
M
ar
ch
 5
, 2
01
4
H
.B
. 1
17
3
Es
ta
bl
ish
es
 C
au
se
s o
f A
ct
io
n 
in
 M
ed
ic
al
 
M
al
pr
ac
tic
e L
aw
su
its
94
/6
1
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
M
S
Fe
br
ua
ry
 1
4,
 2
01
3
S.
B.
 2
79
5
Re
qu
ire
s P
hy
sic
ia
ns
 to
 A
dm
in
ist
er
 A
bo
rt
io
n 
Pr
es
cr
ip
tio
ns
39
/1
2
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
C
M
ar
ch
 2
, 2
01
1
S.
B.
 3
3
M
ed
ic
al
 M
al
pr
ac
tic
e A
m
en
dm
en
ts
36
/1
3
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
Ta
bl
e 
A
1 
(C
on
tin
ue
d )
 
Re
gi
on
 
 
D
at
e
 B
ill
 N
um
be
r
Ti
tle
Ye
s/
N
o
 
 
 
To
rt
 L
aw
Li
ab
ili
ty
7KLVFRQWHQWGRZQORDGHGIURPRQ)HEUXDU\$0
$OOXVHVXEMHFWWR8QLYHUVLW\RI&KLFDJR3UHVV7HUPVDQG&RQGLWLRQVKWWSZZZMRXUQDOVXFKLFDJRHGXWDQGF
381
N
J
Ja
nu
ar
y 
7,
 2
00
8
S.
 1
76
Ex
pa
nd
in
g 
D
am
ag
es
 fo
r W
ro
ng
fu
l D
ea
th
21
/1
1
W
ro
ng
fu
l d
ea
th
 g
en
er
al
Ex
te
nd
ed
N
J
Ja
nu
ar
y 
7,
 2
00
8
S.
 1
76
Ex
pa
nd
in
g 
D
am
ag
es
 fo
r W
ro
ng
fu
l D
ea
th
41
/3
2
W
ro
ng
fu
l d
ea
th
 g
en
er
al
Ex
te
nd
ed
N
V
A
pr
il 
20
, 2
00
9
A
.B
. 4
95
Re
m
ov
in
g 
M
ed
ic
al
 M
al
pr
ac
tic
e A
w
ar
d 
Ca
p
26
/1
5
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Ex
te
nd
ed
O
K
M
ar
ch
 1
5,
 2
00
6
H
.C
.S
. H
.B
. 3
12
0
To
rt
 R
ef
or
m
 B
ill
58
/4
1
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Re
str
ic
te
d
O
K
M
ar
ch
 1
3,
 2
00
7
S.
B.
 5
07
Fi
re
ar
m
 In
ju
ry
 L
ia
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
To
rt
 R
ef
or
m
42
/5
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Re
str
ic
te
d
O
K
A
pr
il 
17
, 2
00
7
S.
B.
 5
07
Co
m
pr
eh
en
siv
e T
or
t R
ef
or
m
—
Pr
ov
id
e
57
/3
9
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Re
str
ic
te
d
O
K
A
pr
il 
19
, 2
00
7
S.
B.
 5
07
Co
m
pr
eh
en
siv
e T
or
t R
ef
or
m
—
Pr
ov
id
e
25
/2
3
Pr
od
uc
t l
ia
bi
lit
y
Re
str
ic
te
d
O
K
Fe
br
ua
ry
 1
8,
 2
00
9
H
.B
. 1
60
2
A
tto
rn
ey
 F
ee
 L
im
its
54
/4
6
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
O
K
M
ar
ch
 4
, 2
00
9
H
.B
. 1
60
3
To
rt
 L
aw
 A
m
en
dm
en
ts
61
/3
9
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
O
K
A
pr
il 
22
, 2
00
9
H
.B
. 1
60
2
A
tto
rn
ey
 F
ee
 L
im
its
23
/2
3
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
O
K
A
pr
il 
22
, 2
00
9
H
.B
. 1
60
3
To
rt
 L
aw
 A
m
en
dm
en
ts
27
/1
9
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
O
K
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
3,
 2
01
1
S.
B.
 8
63
Co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r N
on
-e
co
no
m
ic
 D
am
ag
es
29
/1
8
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
PA
A
pr
il 
11
, 2
01
1
H
.B
. 1
Co
m
pa
ra
tiv
e N
eg
lig
en
ce
 P
ro
vi
sio
ns
11
2/
88
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
PA
Ju
ne
 2
1,
 2
01
1
S.
B.
 1
13
1
To
rt
 A
m
en
dm
en
ts
32
/1
8
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
PA
Ju
ne
 2
7,
 2
01
1
S.
B.
 1
13
1
To
rt
 A
m
en
dm
en
ts
11
6/
83
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
TN
M
ay
 1
7,
 2
00
6
S.
A
. 1
50
5
M
ed
ic
al
 M
al
pr
ac
tic
e L
im
its
 A
m
en
dm
en
t
13
/1
6
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
U
T
M
ar
ch
 1
0,
 2
00
9
S.
B.
 7
9
El
ev
at
in
g 
St
an
da
rd
 o
f P
ro
of
 fo
r S
pe
ci
fic
 
M
ed
ic
al
 M
al
pr
ac
tic
e L
aw
su
its
53
/1
8
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
W
I
Ja
nu
ar
y 
19
, 2
00
6
A
.B
. 7
66
M
ed
ic
al
 M
al
pr
ac
tic
e L
aw
su
it 
Ca
ps
63
/3
6
M
ed
ic
al
 m
al
pr
ac
tic
e
Re
str
ic
te
d
W
I
A
pr
il 
28
, 2
00
9
S.
B.
 2
0
D
isc
rim
in
at
or
y 
Pa
y 
Co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n
18
/1
5
W
or
kp
la
ce
 d
isc
rim
in
at
io
n
Ex
te
nd
ed
W
I
Ja
nu
ar
y 
18
, 2
01
1
S.
B.
 1
To
rt
 L
aw
 A
m
en
dm
en
ts
19
/1
4
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
W
I
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
, 2
01
1
S.
B.
 1
To
rt
 L
aw
 A
m
en
dm
en
ts
57
/3
6
G
en
er
al
Re
str
ic
te
d
W
I
O
ct
ob
er
 2
7,
 2
01
1
S.
B.
 1
2
Li
m
its
 A
tto
rn
ey
 F
ee
s i
n 
Co
ns
um
er
 C
as
es
17
/1
5
O
th
er
Re
str
ic
te
d
W
I
N
ov
em
be
r 3
, 2
01
1
S.
B.
 2
02
Re
pe
al
s P
un
iti
ve
 D
am
ag
es
 fo
r W
or
kp
la
ce
 
D
isc
rim
in
at
io
n
17
/1
6
W
or
kp
la
ce
 d
isc
rim
in
at
io
n
Re
str
ic
te
d
W
I
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
1,
 2
01
2
S.
B.
 2
02
Re
pe
al
s P
un
iti
ve
 D
am
ag
es
 fo
r W
or
kp
la
ce
 
D
isc
rim
in
at
io
n
60
/3
5
W
or
kp
la
ce
 d
isc
rim
in
at
io
n
Re
str
ic
te
d
N
ot
e. 
D
at
a a
re
 fr
om
 P
ro
je
ct
 V
ot
e S
m
ar
t. 
Th
e t
itl
es
 ar
e a
ss
ig
ne
d 
by
 P
ro
je
ct
 V
ot
e S
m
ar
t a
nd
 ar
e n
ot
 th
e a
ct
ua
l t
itl
es
 o
f t
he
 le
gi
sla
tio
n.
7KLVFRQWHQWGRZQORDGHGIURPRQ)HEUXDU\$0
$OOXVHVXEMHFWWR8QLYHUVLW\RI&KLFDJR3UHVV7HUPVDQG&RQGLWLRQVKWWSZZZMRXUQDOVXFKLFDJRHGXWDQGF
382 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS
References
Ai, Chunrong, and Edward C. Norton. 2003. Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models. 
Economics Letters 80:123–29.
Avraham, Ronen. 2007. An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical 
Malpractice Settlement Payments. Journal of Legal Studies 36:S183–S229.
Besley, Timothy. 2005. Political Selection. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(3):43–60.
Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate. 1997. An Economic Model of Representative De-
mocracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:85–114.
———. 2003. Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence. Journal of the 
European Economic Association 1:1176–1206.
Braendle, Thomas, and Alois Stutzer. 2010. Public Servants in Parliament: Theory and Ev-
idence on Its Determinants in Germany. Public Choice 145:223–52.
———. 2011. Selection of Public Servants into Politics. Discussion Paper No. 2011/06. 
University of Basel, Department of Business and Economics, Basel.
Carpinello, George F. 1989. Should Practicing Lawyers Be Legislators? Hastings Law Jour-
nal 41:87–130.
Caselli, Francesco, and Massimo Morelli. 2004. Bad Politicians. Journal of Public Econom-
ics 88:759–82.
Caudill, Steven B., and John D. Jackson. 1989. Measuring Marginal Effects in Limited De-
pendent Variable Models. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series D 38:203–6.
Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra, and Esther Duflo. 2004. Women as Policy Makers: Evi-
dence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India. Econometrica 72:1409–43.
Derge, David R. 1959. The Lawyer as Decision-Maker in the American State Legislature. 
Journal of Politics 21:408–33.
———. 1962. The Lawyer in the Indiana General Assembly. Midwest Journal of Political 
Science 6:19–53.
de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1838. Democracy in America. 2nd American ed. New York: G. 
Dearborn.
Dyer, James A. 1976. Do Lawyers Vote Differently? A Study of Voting on No-Fault Insur-
ance. Journal of Politics 38:452–56.
Eisenberg, Theodore, and Geoffrey P. Miller. 2004. Attorney Fees in Class Action Settle-
ments: An Empirical Study. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 1:27–78.
Engstrom, Richard L., and Patrick F. O’Connor. 1980. Lawyer-Legislators and Support for 
State Legislative Reform. Journal of Politics 42:267–76.
Epstein, Richard A. 1988. The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform. American 
Economic Review 78:311–15.
Finley, Lucinda  M. 2004. The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform. Emory Law Journal 53: 
1263–1314.
Gagliarducci, Stefano, Tommaso Nannicini, and Paolo Naticchioni. 2010. Moonlighting 
Politicians. Journal of Public Economics 94:688–99.
Gehlbach, Scott, Konstantin Sonin, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2010. Businessman Can-
didates. American Journal of Political Science 54:718–36.
Gelman, Andrew, Aleks Jakulin, Maria Grazia Pittau, and Yu-Sung Su. 2008. A Weakly In-
formative Default Prior Distribution for Logistic and Other Regression Models. Annals 
of Applied Statistics 2:1360–83.
Goldberg, John  C., and Benjamin Zipursky. 2010. The Easy Case for Products Liability 
Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell. Harvard Law Review 123:1919–48.
7KLVFRQWHQWGRZQORDGHGIURPRQ)HEUXDU\$0
$OOXVHVXEMHFWWR8QLYHUVLW\RI&KLFDJR3UHVV7HUPVDQG&RQGLWLRQVKWWSZZZMRXUQDOVXFKLFDJRHGXWDQGF
 Lawyer-Legislators and Tort Reform 383
Graves, William Brooke. 1946. American State Government. 3rd ed. Boston: Heath.
Green, Justin J., John R. Schmidhauser, Larry L. Berg, and David Brady. 1973. Lawyers in 
Congress: A New Look at Some Old Assumptions. Western Political Quarterly 26:440–
52.
Hadfield, Gillian K. 2000. The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Jus-
tice System. Michigan Law Review 98:953–1006.
Hain, Paul L., and James E. Piereson. 1975. Lawyers and Politics Revisited: Structural Ad-
vantages of Lawyer-Politicians. American Journal of Political Science 19:41–51.
Handberg, Roger B., Jr. 1976. The 1974 Term of the United States Supreme Court. Western 
Political Quarterly 29:298–312.
Hanmer, Michael J., and Kerem Ozan Kalkan. 2013. Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best 
Approach to Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects from Limited De-
pendent Variable Models. American Journal of Political Science 57:263–77.
Hyneman, Charles S. 1940. Who Makes Our Laws? Political Science Quarterly 55:556–81.
Klick, Jonathan, and Catherine  M. Sharkey. 2008. What Drives the Passage of Damage 
Caps? Pp. 229–330 in Empirical Studies of Judicial Systems around the Globe, edited by 
Kuo-Chang Huang. Taiwan: Institutum Jurisprudentiae.
Lazer, David, Alex Pentland, Lada Adamic, Sinan Aral, Albert-László Barabási, Devon 
Brewer, Nicholas Christakis, Noshir Contractor, James Fowler, Myron Gutmann, Tony 
Jebara, Gary King, Michael Macy, Deb Roy, and Marshall Van Alstyne. 2009. Computa-
tional Social Science. Science 323:721–23.
Lee, David S. 2001. The Electoral Advantage to Incumbency and Voters’ Valuation of Poli-
ticians’ Experience: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Elections to the U.S. House. 
Working Paper No. 8441. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Levitt, Steven D. 1996. How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Prefer-
ences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology. American Economic Review 86:425–41.
List, John  A., and Daniel  M. Sturm. 2006. How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence 
from Environmental Policy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121:1249–81.
Luce, Robert. 1924. Legislative Assemblies: Their Framework, Make-up, Character, Charac-
teristics, Habits, and Manners. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Matter, Ulrich. 2013. pvsR: An R Package to Interact with the Project Vote Smart API for 
Scientific Research. R package version 0.2.1. http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=pvsR.
Matter, Ulrich, and Alois Stutzer. 2015. pvsR: An Open Source Interface to Big Data on 
the American Political Sphere. PLOS ONE 10(7):e0130501.
Mattozzi, Andrea, and Antonio Merlo. 2008. Political Careers or Career Politicians? Jour-
nal of Public Economics 92:597–608.
Miceli, Thomas J., and Michael P. Stone. 2013. The Determinants of State-Level Caps on 
Punitive Damages: Theory and Evidence. Contemporary Economic Policy 31:110–25.
Miller, Mark C. 1995. The High Priests of American Politics: The Role of Lawyers in Ameri-
can Political Institutions. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. Political Recruitment: Gender, Race, and Class 
in the British Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Osborne, Martin J., and Al Slivinski. 1996. A Model of Political Competition with Citizen- 
Candidates. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111:65–96.
Podmore, David. 1977. Lawyers and Politics. British Journal of Law and Society 4:155–85.
Polinsky, Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 2010a. A Skeptical Attitude about Product Liability 
Is Justified. Harvard Law Review 123:1949–68.
———. 2010b. The Uneasy Case for Product Liability. Harvard Law Review 123:1437–92.
7KLVFRQWHQWGRZQORDGHGIURPRQ)HEUXDU\$0
$OOXVHVXEMHFWWR8QLYHUVLW\RI&KLFDJR3UHVV7HUPVDQG&RQGLWLRQVKWWSZZZMRXUQDOVXFKLFDJRHGXWDQGF
384 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS
Rosenson, Beth A. 2006. The Impact of Ethics Laws on Legislative Recruitment and the 
Occupational Composition of State Legislatures. Political Research Quarterly 59:619–27.
Roth, Andrew, and Jonathan Roth. 1989. Devil’s Advocates: The Unnatural History of Law-
yers. Berkeley, CA: Nolo Press.
Rubin, Paul H. 2005. Public Choice and Tort Reform. Public Choice 124:223–36.
Rubin, Paul  H., and Martin  J. Bailey. 1994. The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law. 
Journal of Legal Studies 23:807–31.
Rubin, Paul H., and Joanna M. Shepherd. 2008. The Demographics of Tort Reform. Re-
view of Law and Economics 4:591–620.
Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1957. Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View. Midwest 
Journal of Political Science 1:26–39.
Shapiro, Carl. 1991. Symposium on the Economics of Liability. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 5(3):3–10.
Sharkey, Catherine M. 2005. Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages 
Caps. New York University Law Review 80:391–512.
Shepherd, Joanna M. 2008. Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of 
Care and Activity Levels. UCLA Law Review 55:905–77.
Sugarman, Stephen  D. 2002. United States Tort Reform Wars. University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 25:849–53.
———. 2006. Ideological Flip-Flop: American Liberals Are Now the Primary Supporters 
of Tort Law. Pp. 1105–22 in Essays on Tort, Insurance, Law, and Society in Honour of 
Bill W. Dufwa, edited by Hugo Tiberg and Martin Clarke. Stockholm: Jure AB.
Swers, Michele. 2001. Understanding the Policy Impact of Electing Women: Evidence 
from Research on Congress and State Legislatures. PS: Political Science and Politics 
34:217–20.
Towers Watson. 2012. U.S. Tort Costs Trends 2011 Update. New York: Towers Watson.
US Council of Economic Advisers. 2004. Economic Report of the President. Washington, 
DC: US Council of Economic Advisers.
Warren, Charles. 1911. A History of the American Bar. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
Washington, Ebonya L. 2008. Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legisla-
tor Fathers’ Voting on Women’s Issues. American Economic Review 98:311–32.
White, Michelle J. 1992. Legal Complexity and Lawyers’ Benefit from Litigation. Interna-
tional Review of Law and Economics 12:381–95.
Winkelmann, Rainer, and Stefan Boes. 2006. Analysis of Microdata. Berlin: Springer.
Zywicki, Todd J. 2000. Public Choice and Tort Reform. Research Paper No. 00-36. George 
Mason University, School of Law, Fairfax, VA.
7KLVFRQWHQWGRZQORDGHGIURPRQ)HEUXDU\$0
$OOXVHVXEMHFWWR8QLYHUVLW\RI&KLFDJR3UHVV7HUPVDQG&RQGLWLRQVKWWSZZZMRXUQDOVXFKLFDJRHGXWDQGF
